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You Must Go Home Again: Friedrich v. Friedrich,
The Hague Convention and The International
Child Abduction Remedies Act
I.

Introduction

The increasing globalization of society, due to technological innovation and political cooperation, has effected profoundly the nature of international divorce and child custody and has highlighted
the necessity of a multi-national solution to the legal, practical and
emotional problems associated with international custody disputes.
Jurisdictional differences and national sovereignty issues have inhibited the development of such solutions, however, and in fact have
encouraged "child-snatching." In many instances, an abducting parent is able to take the child to another nation, re-open litigation, and
be awarded custody in the new jurisdiction.I
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction (Convention) is an international effort to reconcile
the competing policies of national jurisdictional discretion and the
deterrence of parental abduction. 2 The Convention has two stated
objectives: "to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed or retained in any Contracting state; and to ensure that the
rights of custody and access under the laws of one Contracting state
are effectively respected in the other Contracting states." ' 3 The overriding goal of the Convention is the prompt return of the abducted
child to the country of his or her "habitual residence." '4 An international analysis of "the merits of any custody issue" specifically is
I Child snatching is defined as the abduction of a child, prior to a custody decree, by
a parent seeking to prevent the other parent from obtaining custody; or after a custody
decree by either parent in violation of the decree. Most cases involve a non-custodial
parent kidnapping or retaining a child in violation of the custodial parent's rights. SANFORD N. KATZ, CHILD SNATCHING 14 (1981) [hereinafter KATZ, CHILD SNATCHING]; see also
Dana R. Rivers, The Hague InternationalChild Abduction Convention and The InternationalChild

Abduction Remedies Act: Closing the Doors to the Parent Abductor, 2 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 589 (1989)
[hereinafter Rivers, Child Abduction]. Custody proceedings are not considered final judg-

ments, and as a result, they are potentially modifiable by a court which can establish jurisdiction. KATZ, CHILD SNATCHING, supra at 61-71.
2 Bridgette M. Bodenheimer, The Hague Draft Convention on InternationalChild Abduction, 14 FAM. L. Q. 99, 102 (1980).
3 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980,
art. I, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,498 (1986) [hereinafter Convention].
4 Id. at pmbl.
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precluded. 5
The United States adopted the Convention in 1988 in the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA). 6 Since that time,
several state courts have ordered the return of children abducted to
the United States. 7 Yet, few appellate courts have considered
ICARA cases. In Friedrichv. Friedrich,8 however, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court in an ICARA matter and remanded the case
for consideration under appropriate German law. In doing so, the
circuit court strictly adhered to the essence of the Convention and its
emphasis that the merits of the custody struggle be analyzed "under
the laws of the country of habitual residence." 9 This Note will examine the reasoning behind the court's decision in Friedrich, the potential effects of the holding, and its relation to the ancillary policies
of the Convention and ICARA. This Note concludes that the court's
resolution of the case is vitally important to the continuing success
and reciprocity of the Convention, and ultimately reinforces this nation's commitment to deterring future abductions.
II.

Statement of the Case

Emanuel and Jeana Friedrich were married in December 1989,
in the Federal Republic of Germany.' 0 Mrs. Friedrich, a U.S. citizen
and member of the U.S. Army, was stationed in Bad Aibling, Germany. Her husband, the petitioner in this case, is a German citizen.II The couple had one child, Thomas, who was born in Germany
shortly after the marriage. After his birth, Thomas resided off-base
with both of his parents. The Friedrichs separated twice during their
marriage-briefly in June 1990, and again in March 1991, during
2
which time Mr. Friedrich retained physical custody of Thomas.'
The couple was reunited from mid-May until July 27th, when Mr.
Friedrich ordered his wife to leave their apartment and to take their
son. Mrs. Friedrich returned to the Army base, where she and
Thomas remained for four days.' 3 During that period, the couple
met at least twice to discuss their separation and their son's wellbeing. 14
5 Id. art. 19.
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610 (1988).
7 See, e.g., Navarro v. Bullock, 15 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1576 (1989) (ordering children's return to Spain after mother retained them after visitation); Becker v. Becker, 15
Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1605 (1989) (ordering children's return to Australia when father retained them after visitation); Sheikh v. Cahill, 546 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1989) (ordering return to
United Kingdom when father retained child in violation of British custody order).
8 983 F.2d 1396, 1403 (6th Cir. 1993) (Lambros, CJ., dissenting).
9 Id. at 1402.
10 Id. at 1398.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 1399.
13 Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1399 (6th Cir. 1993).
14 Id.
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On August 1st, without the consent, knowledge or permission of
her husband, Mrs. Friedrich took her son and left Germany to go to
the United States. 15 Upon discovering that his son had been removed to the United States, Mr. Friedrich filed a claim in Germany
for custody of Thomas.16 Meanwhile, Mrs. Friedrich arrived in Ohio,
and on August 9th, she instituted divorce proceedings within that
state. On August 22nd, a German court awarded custody of Thomas
to Mr. Friedrich. On August 28th, an Ohio court granted custody to
Mrs. Friedrich. Both parties claimed they did not receive notice of

each other's proceeding. 17 Following these decisions, Mr. Friedrich
then filed a claim in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio, alleging that his wife's removal of their son from Germany
8
violated the Hague Convention.'
The Convention limits the authority of the court solely to the
merits of the abduction claim and to the determination of whether
the child has been "wrongfully removed" from the country in which
that child habitually resided. 19 The Convention defines "wrongful
removal" as one that is in breach of custody rights attributed under
the laws of the State in which the child habitually resided before removal, provided that at the time of removal, these rights actually
were exercised.2 0 Under ICARA, the petitioner has the burden of
2
demonstrating wrongful removal. '
The district court 22 held that Mr. Friedrich failed to make the
requisite showing for wrongful removal. The court determined that
by kicking his wife and son out of the apartment on July 27th, Mr.
Friedrich simultaneously "altered" Thomas's habitual residence
from Germany to the U.S. and "terminated" his custody rights.
Without custody rights there could be no breach of those rights, and
23
consequently, no wrongful removal.
The court of appeals explicitly rejected the district court's finding that "habitual residence" and rights of custody were immediately
altered by Mr. Friedrich's expulsion of his wife and child from the
apartment. 24 While both the district court and court of appeals
agreed that prior to July 27 Thomas's habitual residence was in Germany, in interpreting the term "habitual residence," the court of ap15
16
17
18

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.

19 Convention, supra note 3, at 10,500.
20 Id. at 10,498. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.

21 42 U.S.C. § 11603 (e)(1).
22 42 U.S.C. § 11603 (a) grants state and federal courts concurrent original jurisdiction to hear cases under the Convention. This is a radical departure from tradition, as
federal courts do not generally entangle themselves in domestic relations.

23 Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1400 (6th Cir. 1993).
24 Id. at 1401.
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peals determined that it "must focus on the child, not the parents,
and examine past experience, not future intentions."12 5 Limiting its
analysis in this manner, the court noted that the boy was born in
Germany and lived there almost exclusively for his entire life. 2 6 The

court concluded that Mrs. Friedrich's plans for Thomas to reside
27
eventually in the United States were "irrelevant to our inquiry."
According to the Sixth Circuit, a change of habitual residence
would require both a change in geography and the passage of time,
and would necessarily precede any questionable, unilateral removal. 28 To hold otherwise, the court reasoned, would effectively
encourage abduction under the guise of "alterations of habitual residence." 29 Finding no evidence to support the holding that Mr.
Friedrich's expulsion of his wife and child from their apartment was
tantamount to his acquiescence to their subsequent departure from
was a habitual resident of GerGermany, the court held that Thomas
30
many at the time of the removal.
Similar reasoning was applied to the status of Mr. Friedrich's
custody rights after expelling his wife and son from the apartment.
The court wrote: "[U]nder the Convention, a determination of
whether a parent was exercising lawful custody rights over a child at
the time of removal must be determined under the law of the child's
habitual residence."'' s The court already held that Thomas' habitual
residence was Germany, but neither party, nor the district court, had
considered German custody law. They had considered American
law, under which "custodial rights can only be terminated by judicial
action, or by circumstances much more extraordinary than those
presented here." 3 2 The court of appeals thus chose to remand the
case to the district court with instructions "to make a specific inquiry
as to whether, under German law, Mr. Friedrich was exercising his cus33
tody rights at the time of Thomas' removal."
In dissent, Chief DistrictJudge Thomas D. Lambros3 4 found the
trial judge's efforts "laudable" and completely compatible with the
25 Id.
26 Id.

27 Id. The court reiterated its insistence on focusing on the child and not the parents,
adding that habitual residence is not based upon whether the father or the mother "as-

sumes the role of primary caretaker," and is unaffected "by changes in parental affection
and responsibility." Id. at 1401-02.
28 Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1401 (6th Cir. 1993).
29 Id.
30 Id. at 1402. The court took note of the fact that after the separation, Mr. Friedrich

continued to have contact with both his wife and son, and that on August 1st (the day Mrs.
Friedrich left Germany), had arranged specific times to meet with Thomas during the next
week. Id.
31 Id.; see also Convention, supra note 3, art 3.
32 Fiiedich, 983 F.2d at 1402.

33 Id. (emphasis added).
34 Chief Judge, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by
designation.
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objectives of the Convention.3 5 Rights of custody, under the Convention, include those rights relating to the care of the child and the
right to determine the child's place of residence.3 6 Applying the
"clearly erroneous" standard of review,3 7 Judge Lambros accepted
the lower court's finding that the petitioner, by expelling his wife and
child from the apartment, terminated his right to determine the
child's place of residence and his actual exercise of his parental custody rights.3 8 Without a right to custody, the petitioner had no
cause of action for wrongful removal.
II.

Background Law

The adversarial and extremely emotional nature of custody proceedings often leads to physical and psychological manipulation of a
child by the parents.3 9 Child custody law has historically been rife
with ambiguity concerning jurisdiction and, as a result, it has encouraged forum shopping and child abduction. 40 Until 1968, jurisdiction to make or modify both domestic and international child
custody decrees could be based on any one of several factors, including domicile of the child, residence of the child or at least residence
of one parent in the state, or personal jurisdiction over both parents. 4 ' Utilizing one of these alternatives and a "best interests of the
child" rationale, courts regularly would exercise concurrent jurisdiction over custody cases and modify, rather than enforce, existing decrees. 4 2 As a result, the problem of child abduction was exacerbated.
A.

Statutory Law

In an effort to provide uniform regulation to the problem of inter-jurisdictional custody litigation, the United States adopted two
critical pieces of legislation, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act (UCCJA), 43 and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
(PKPA). 44 While the primary focus of these acts is domestic custody
disputes, the UCCJA specifically authorizes the unilateral application
35 Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1403. (Lambros, C.J., dissenting).
36 Id. Convention, supra note 3, art. 5.
37 FED. R. Civ. PRO. 52(a). The "clearly erroneous" standard requires that findings
of fact by the trial judge remain undisturbed unless the appellate court determines by the
weight of the entire evidence that a definite mistake has been made. Generally, great deference should be given to the trial court, because it alone has the opportunity to judge the
credibility of the evidence. Id.
38 Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1403. (Lambros, C.J., dissenting).
39 Rivers, Child Abduction, supra note 1, at 595.
40 Christopher Blakesley, Child Custody-Jurisdiction & Procedure, 35 EMORY L.J. 291297 (1986) [hereinafter Blakesley, Child Custody].
41 Id. at 298.
42 See KATz, CHILD SNATCHING, supra note 1, at 13.
43 9 U.L.A. 115 (1968).
44 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1993).
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of its provisions to foreign custody decrees. 4 5 As such, an examination of its jurisdictional elements provides insight into the state of
46
American law prior to the adoption the Convention.
Under the UCCJA, which was enacted in 1968, jurisdiction primarily is based on either a "home state" or a "best interest" analysis. 4 7 "Home state" is defined as the state in which the child and at
least one parent has lived for a minimum of six months immediately
preceding the commencement of a present action. 48 A state can invoke jurisdiction under the "best interests" test if it can show that it
has significant connections regarding the child's present or future
care and personal relationships. 4 9 This dichotomy does not resolve
the problems of concurrent jurisdiction even though the Act requires
that states enforce decrees from other states or nations. 50 Recognition and enforcement is only mandated for decrees issued in accordance with the Act however, and a judge is free to exercise discretion
in determining whether a previous court has complied sufficiently
51
with UCCJA provisions.
Additional uncertainty surrounds the recognition and enforcement of foreign custody decrees. Not only are there problems with
ambiguous notice requirements, 52 but courts hearing international
cases have relied on analyses regarding "changed circumstances" or
the "best interests of the child" in deciding not to enforce foreign
decrees. 53 In addition, American courts traditionally have been hos45 "The general policies of this Act extend to the international area. The provisions
of this Act relating to the recognition and enforcement of custody decrees of other states
apply to custody decrees ... of other nations if reasonable notice and opportunity to be
heard were given to all affected persons." UCCJA, 9 U.L.A. 115 § 23 (1968).
46 See id. § 3.
47 Id.
48 Id. at § 2. " 'Home state' means the state in which the child immediately preceding
the time involved lived with his parents, a parent, or person acting as parent, for at least 6
consecutive months, and in the case of a child less than 6 months old the state in which the
child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. Periods of temporary absence of
any of the named persons are counted as part of the 6-month or other period." Id.
49 Id. § 3(2). The purpose of providing alternative grounds for jurisdiction was to
ensure sufficient flexibility in the Act to cover diverse factual scenarios. Consider a case
where state A was the site of the marital home and residence of the family for five years,
before one spouse and the child moved to state B for six months. While state B satisfies
the definitional requirements to invoke "home state" jurisdiction, it is inherently illogical
to deny any jurisdictional rights to state A, which in a sense has "maximum contacts" with
the child. See, e.g., Houtchens v. Houtchens, 488 A.2d 726 (R.I. 1985) (holding that jurisdiction based on "significant connections" was proper where paternal grandparents and
father both resided in state and took part in raising children, despite fact that father unilaterally removed children from their home state); E.E.B. v. D.A., 446 A.2d 871 (N.J. 1982)
(holding that UCCJA does not compel strict adherence to home state jurisdiction, but
permits state best positioned to consider the best interests of the child to render a custody
decision); see also Blakesley, Child Custody, supra note 40, at 359.
50 UCCJA, 9 U.L.A. 115, § 13 (1968).
51 See KATZ, CHILD SNATCHING, supra note 1, at 32.
52 See supra note 45.
53 Rivers, Child Abduction, supra note 1, at 607-08.
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tile toward decrees issued by nations whose cultural, political and
legal traditions vary widely from those of the United States.5 4 In
spite of its goals, vague language and jurisdictional loopholes have
55
prevented the UCCJA from successfully deterring child abduction.
Congress passed the PKPA in 1980 to remedy the jurisdictional
gaps and contradictions in the UCCJA. 56 The PKPA has not impacted significantly international custody disputes, however, because
it fails to address or mandate giving "full faith and credit" to foreign
decrees. 57 Despite its purpose as a complement to the UCCJA, the
PKPA makes no mention of international custody decrees or international child abduction. Its provisions instead are expressly limited to
domestic custody cases. 5 8 While the combination of the UCCJA and
the PKPA helped to resolve some of the problems surrounding domestic abductions, the problem of international child abduction
clearly required some international resolution.
B.

The Hague Convention and the InternationalChild Abduction
Remedies Act (ICARA)

The Convention unanimously was adopted on October 24,
1980, at the Fourteenth Session of the Hague Conference. 59 The
United States adopted the Convention in 1988 in the International
Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA). 60 The Convention
uniquely is designed to attack the problem of international child abduction in that it authorizes a court in a contracting state 6' to determine the merits of the abduction claim only, not the merits of the
underlying custody dispute. 62 In recommending the Convention for
Senate approval, President Ronald Reagan described its objectives
as follows:
The Convention's approach to the problem of international child
abduction is a simple one. The Convention is designed promptly to
restore the factual situation that existed prior to a child's removal or
retention. It does not seek to settle disputes about legal custody
rights, nor does it depend upon the existence of court orders as a
condition for returning children. The international abductor is denied legal advantage from the abduction... as resort to the Conven54 See KATZ, CHILD SNATCHING, supra note 1,at 77.
55 Rivers, Child Abduction, supra note 1, at 608.
56 28 U.S.C. § 1738A.
57 Rivers, Child Abduction, supra note 1, at 609.
58

See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A. Subsection (b)(8) defines 'state' as used in the Act to mean

"'a
State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,

or a territory or possession of the United States." Id.
59 See Convention, supra note 3.

60 42 U.S.C. § 11601-11610 (1988).
61 As of March 17, 1992, the following nations ratified the Convention: Argentina,
Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, and Yugoslavia. 18 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1232 (1992).
62 Convention, supra note 3, art. 19.
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tion is to affect the child's swift return to his or her circumstances
before the abduction .... In most cases this will mean return to the
country of the child's habitual residence6 3where any dispute about
custody rights can be heard and settled.
The decision to limit court discretion in reviewing the merits of
foreign custody decrees demonstrates the Convention's overriding
commitment to deterring parental abduction. 64 Full recognition and
enforcement of foreign rulings and immediate restoration of the status quo ante were considered essential in eliminating any incentive to
or advantage for the parent abductor. 65 The Convention itself defines its objectives as securing "the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State," and ensuring
"that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting
States." '66 Removal of a child is "wrongful" within the terms of the
Convention when:
a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the
State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before
the removal or retention; and b) at the time of removal or retention
those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone,6 7or would
have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.
Custody rights under the Convention include all rights relating
to the welfare of the child, and "in particular, the right to determine
the child's place of residence." '6 8 In many countries, including the
United States, such custody rights are shared equally by both parents
prior to the issuance of a court order, and thus, may be violated by
the unilateral action of one parent without the consent of the
69
other.
The Convention does not define the term "habitual residence,"
and instead relies on courts to apply a generally understood meaning
of the term to the particular facts and circumstances presented in
each case.7 0 This flexibility avoids the difficult problem of imposing
international jurisdictional rules, and ensures that the prompt return
63 Letter of Transmittal from President Ronald Reagan (Oct. 30, 1985), 51 Fed. Reg.
10,495 (1986).
64 Bodenheimer, supra note 2, at 102.
65 Id.
66 Convention, supra note 3, art. 1.
67 Id. art. 3. Article 3 also includes the following provision concerning the source of

custody rights: "The rights of custody mentioned . . . above, may arise in particular by
operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of
agreement having legal effect under the law of that state." This is essential, because it
affords the convention's protection to parents who do not have a judicial custody decree.
68 Id. art. 5.

69 Legal Analysis of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,503, 10,506 (1986) [hereinafter Legal Analysis].
70 4 CHILD CUSTODY & VISITATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 32.02[2], (John P. McCahey,
ed., 1993) [hereinafter McCahey]; see also, In Re Bates, No. CA 122.89 High Court ofJustice, Family Div'n Ct. Royal Court ofJustice, United Kingdom (1989) (courts should avoid
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of children remains the principle objective of the Convention. 7 ' In
addition, the focus on habitual residence deprives the abductor of
72
any advantage otherwise gained by forum shopping.
Even if the petitioner can establish that the child was wrongfully
removed from his or her habitual residence, there are four exceptions in the Convention which the respondent can invoke to defeat
the action for return. 73 These exceptions illustrate the desire of the
drafters to allow contracting states to retain some autonomy in custody disputes and protect the best interests of the child in particular
fact situations. 74 Implicit in the adoption of these exceptions was the
understanding that, in order to effectuate the goals and objectives of
75
the Convention, they are to be used sparingly.
Section 13(a) of the Convention creates a "no custodial rights"
exception. If the respondent can show that the petitioner either was
not actually exercising custody rights at the time of removal, or consented to or acquiesced in the removal, then such action is not
"wrongful" within the meaning of the Convention. 7 6 Section 13(b)
creates a second exception, which allows retention if "there is a
grave risk of harm that return ... would expose the child to physical
or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable
situation."' 77 The precise language of this exception indicates the
narrow scope the drafters intended it to have. According to the
Legal Analysis of the Hague Convention, a document accompanying
the Convention and detailing its legislative purpose and intent,
"[t]his provision was not intended to be used . . . as a vehicle to
litigate the child's best interests . . . . The person opposing the
child's return must show that the risk to the child is grave, not merely
serious."' 78 The Convention also allows a court to refuse return
based on the preferences of the child. 7 9 Consideration of such preferences are left to the discretion of the court and should be based on
a finding that the child has reached an appropriate age and degree of
maturity to make such a decision. 80
The most ambiguous, and consequently the most potentially
developing restrictive rules about habitual residence, and instead should focus on the particular facts and circumstances of each case without presumptions).
71 McCahey, supra note 70, § 32.02[2].
72 Id.

73 Id. arts. 13, 20.
74 Rivers, Child Abduction, supra note 1, at 618.
75 See Legal Analysis, supra note 69, at 10,509.
76 Convention, supra note 3, art. 13(a).
77 Id. art. 13(b).

78 Legal Analysis, supra note 69, at 10,510.
79 Convention, supra note 3, art. 13.
80 Id. Neither the Convention nor the Legal Analysis specify what constitutes an "appropriate" age, instead leaving the matter to the discretion of the court. See, e.g., Tahan v.
Duquette, reported in 19 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1003 (1992) (nine year-old child is of insuffi-

cient age or maturity for the court to consider his preferences in custody decision).
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damaging to the goals of the Convention, is the public policy exception. 8 1 This section allows a court to refuse return if such action
would be prohibited by the "fundamental principles of the requested
state relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms." 8 2 Because of the obvious potential for abuse, the drafters of the Convention suggested that this exception be limited only
to those cases where return of a child would violate the law of the
requested country, or where a similar exception would be invoked in
83
a domestic case.
While it was clearly the intent of the drafters that these exceptions be construed narrowly, the legislation implementing the Convention in the United States takes a step away from a limited
application.8 4 ICARA requires that a respondent claiming either the
"grave risk of harm" or "fundamental principles" exception meet a
clear and convincing evidentiary burden.8 5 For the other affirmative
defenses, however, the respondent need only meet a preponderance
of the evidence standard. 8 6 This reduced burden of proof makes it
easier for a respondent to prevent the child's return from the United
States and indicates a retreat from the U.S. commitment to the essential anti-abducting purpose of the Convention.8 7 The effectiveness of ICARA hinges on the willingness of courts to permit these
exceptions to prevent return of an abducted child.1 8
C. Case Law
Case law interpreting the ICARA provisions is somewhat limited, although Department of State statistics indicate that the
number of cases continues to grow each year.8 9 While both state and
federal courts have jurisdiction to hear these cases, the majority are
brought in state courts. 90
Most judicial interpretations of ICARA have reiterated and reinforced the basic premise of the Convention and ordered the return
of the abducted child. In David S. v. Zamira S.,91 the respondent, a
resident of Canada, fled to New York with her two children. A separation agreement executed before the birth of her second child
81 Rivers, Child Abduction, supra note 1,at 627-28.
82 Convention, supra note 3, art. 20.
83 Legal Analysis, supra note 69, at 10,510-10,511.
84 See 42 U.S.C. § 11603 (1988).
85 Id. § i1603(e)(2)(A).
86 Id.

§ i1603(e)(2)(B).
87 Rivers, Child Abduction, supra note 1, at 636-37.
88 See id.

89 Between 1988 and 1991, there were 683 cases brought under the Convention in
U.S. courts, of which 262 were in the first nine months of 1991. See 18 Fain. L. Rep.
(BNA) 1112 (1992).
90 See, e.g., Navarro v. Bullock, 15 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1576 (1989); Becker v. Becker,
15 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1605 (1989); Sheikh v. Cahill, 546 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1989).
91 574 N.Y.S.2d 429 (Fam. Ct. 1991).
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awarded the respondent custody of her first child, but required her
to remain in the Toronto area to allow her husband to exercise visitation rights. 9 2 The New York court supported the international
perspective of ICARA by deferring repeatedly to the custody laws of
93
Canada, which it deemed the habitual residence of the children.
The court also held that respondent's relocation to New York was
clearly "wrongful" within the meaning of ICARA. Such action
breached petitioner's rights of visitation to the one child, and more
significantly, his right to custody of the other child despite "the ab94
sence of any formal decree of custody.''
A New Jersey court was similarly circumspect in considering a
respondent's claim for a "grave risk of harm" exception in Tahan v.
Duquette.95 The petitioner planned to introduce testimony from a
psychologist and from the child's teacher to show the psychological
harm the child faced if forced to return to Canada.9 6 The court very
clearly announced that it would not intrude on the jurisdiction of the
habitual residence and consider issues that go to the underlying custody issue.9 7 In determining whether a child actually faces a risk of
harm upon return however, the court must be permitted to evaluate
the environment to which the child would be sent, including the basic personal qualities of those who would be in close contact with the
child. 9 8 Respondent's evidence did not address these elements, but
instead focused on substantive custody issues; therefore, the court
ordered the return of the child. 99
Meredith v. Meredith is one of a limited number of federal cases
concerning ICARA. 0 0 Considering the question of habitual residence, the court noted that the term is undefined in the Convention,
and thus "must be determined by the facts and circumstances
presented in each particular case."''
The child in this case resided
her whole life in Arizona, leaving only to accompany her mother on a
trip to Europe. The mother then retained the child in Europe, thus
violating the father's custody rights.' 0 2 After securing a custody
92 Id. at 432. The separation agreement was silent as to the custody of the second
child, who was not yet born at the time of its execution. As a result, both parents had an
equal right to custody of this child. Id.
93 Id.

94 Id.; see also, In Re C (A Minor), UK Ct. App. (Civil) 1988, reported in 139 NEw L.J.
226 (1989) (although mother was vested with physical custody of child, it was a violation of
father's "custody rights" within the Convention for her to remove child from the country

without his consent, when such consent was required by the custody decree).
95 Tahan v. Duquette, 19 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1003 (1992).
96 Id.
97 Id.

98 Id. at 1004.
99 Id.
Ioo 759 F. Supp. 1432 (D. Ariz. 1991).
101 Id. at 1434.

102 Id. at 1433. Prior to the custody award by the Arizona Court, both parents had an
equal right to the custody of the child. Thus, the unilateral retention of the child in Eu-
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award in Arizona, the father went to Europe and retrieved his daughter. At that time, the mother instituted this action under the Convention for return of her daughter, alleging that her habitual
residence was now England, not the United States.10 3 Finding that
the child had spent all of her life in the United States prior to her
removal, the court concluded the United States was indeed her habitual residence irrespective of the child's temporary removal. A contrary conclusion, the court noted, would only reward the abducting
parent and subvert the purpose of the Act. 10 4 The court also held
that although the father acquiesced in the international travel of the
child, the subsequent unilateral retention of the child abroad was
without his consent, and thus violated the father's custody rights
05
within the meaning of the Act.'
The application of ICARA in the above cases reiterates the Act's
elemental principle that courts should avoid resolution of the merits
of a custody dispute and facilitate a restoration of the status quo ante.
These decisions illustrate the importance of a court's limited exercise of discretion and narrow interpretation of statutory exceptions
in effectuating the primary goal of the Act, deterring parental
06

abduction. 1

IV.

Significance of the Case

The decision in Friedrich v. Friedrich is important in the ongoing
development of ICARA jurisprudence. The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals is the highest court to hear an ICARA case, and the decision
comes down squarely in favor of the international aspects and objectives of the Convention. In considering the issues of habitual residence and the exercise of custody rights, the court's factual analysis
was governed by the Convention's overriding policy to return the
07
abducted child.1
The court's determination of the issue of habitual residence
turned upon the rejection of the lower court's finding that the petitioner "altered" his son's habitual residence when he removed the
rope by the mother violated the father's custody rights, even in the absence of any formal
decree. Id. at 1435.
103 Id. at 1433-34.
104 Id. at 1435.
105 Meredith v. Meredith, 759 F. Supp. 1432, 1435 (D. Ariz. 1991).
106 The overriding importance of the principle that a court should not reach the merits of a custody dispute is difficult to overstate. In analyzing a Swiss case in which the court
ignored this principle, the Family Law Reporter stated:
This decision is remarkable, if not indeed perplexing, inasmuch as the Convention was specifically intended to restore pre-abduction status quo . . .
without reaching the merits of a custody dispute or a "best interests" analysis, which is supposed to be resolved later in the country of the child's habitual residence.
15 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1606 (1989).
107 Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1401 (6th Cir. 1993).
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child and his mother from their apartment.' 0 8 Habitual residence
cannot be altered so easily and is not predicated on which parent
assumes the role of primary caretaker. Instead, such an alteration
requires both a change in geography and the passage of time.' 0 9
The essence of the holding on this issue is the court's concern with
the broader, anti-abduction goals of the Convention. This portion of
the opinion concludes, "[i]f we were to determine that ... removing
Thomas from his habitual residence . . . 'altered' Thomas' habitual

residence, we would render the Convention meaningless. It would
be an open invitation for all parents who abduct their children to
characterize their wrongful removals as alterations of habitual
residence."' 10
The court's review of the lower court's holding that Mr. Friedrich "terminated" his custody rights is similarly guided by the overriding international goals of the Convention. The district court's
ruling, and Chief Judge Lambros' dissent in the court of appeals
both examine elements of the custody dispute itself. The majority
expressly refuses to consider any of the underlying custody issues,
and insists that the laws of the child's habitual residence must control. II As such, the court remands the case for consideration of this
affirmative defense under the appropriate German law. 12
The opinion itself reiterates the importance of the policies of the
Convention in its decision. It concludes that
[t]he rights and wrongs of the actions of the respective parents are
[I]t is the clear
not before us for disposition on the merits ....
import of the Convention that in most cases the duty.., when the
niceties of the Convention have been met, is to return the child to
resolution of the custody disthe country of habitual residence for
113
putes under the laws of that state.

This conclusion is consistent with the stated goals of both the
Convention and ICARA, and firmly places the weight of judicial precedent behind deterrence of abduction. The manifest jurisdictional
problems of international custody cases prior to the adoption of the
Convention illustrated the necessity of uniformity to protect the best
interests of the world's children. By tailoring its holding to the express purposes of the Convention, the Sixth Circuit emphasizes the
American judicial commitment to uniformity and international comity in this area.
108

Id.

109 Id. at 1401-02.
1 10 Id.

III Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1402 (6th Cir. 1993).
112 Id. at 1402-03.
113 Id.
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V. Conclusion
The Sixth Circuit's holding in Friedrichv. Friedrich represents the
triumph of the policy considerations behind the Convention. The
court recognized that implicit in the success of the Convention is a
strict application of its provisions." 14 Despite the reduced burdens of
proof adopted in the ICARA, the court rejected a broad interpretation of the exceptions that the drafters so feared." 5 As one of the
highest judicial holdings on these provisions, the precedential effects
are far reaching, and although this action frustrates the efforts of an
American citizen, "it ultimately ensures the prompt return of the
American children abducted to foreign countries pursuant to the
broadest sense of reciprocity under the Convention." ' 1 6 Only by
adopting this global perspective and setting aside concerns about jurisdictional and national sovereignty can the international community deter abduction and effectively protect children.
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114 Rivers, Child Abduction, supra note 1, at 592.

115 Legal Analysis, supra note 69, at 10,509-10,5 10.
116 Rivers, Child Abduction, supra note 1, at 590.

